Threats to IAM: Replay, Pass-the-Hash, Credential Stuffing
Welcome to The Bare Metal Cyber CISSP Prepcast. This series helps you prepare for the ISC squared CISSP exam with focused explanations and practical context.
Today’s episode explores a vital part of identity and access management—understanding the threats that can compromise authentication systems and access controls. Specifically, we are going to cover three major attack types: replay attacks, pass-the-hash exploits, and credential stuffing. Each of these poses a significant risk to secure systems, especially those that rely heavily on digital identities to control access to sensitive resources. As students of cybersecurity, it is important not only to know how these attacks function but also to understand how to defend against them effectively.
Let’s begin with the idea of identity and access management threats. Identity and access management refers to the systems, policies, and procedures that control who can access what resources within an organization. This could include employees logging into their email, systems that need access to databases, or even vendors accessing customer portals. Because these interactions often revolve around usernames and passwords or other credentials, any weakness in these processes becomes a target for attackers. Threats to identity and access management aim to take advantage of these weaknesses to gain unauthorized access, escalate privileges, or move laterally within a network.
Now, the first threat we will explore is the replay attack. In a replay attack, an attacker captures a data transmission between a legitimate user and a service—often during a login session—and later reuses that data to impersonate the user. Think of it like recording someone saying a password and then playing it back later to gain access. The problem here is that unless the system can tell the difference between the original and the replayed communication, it may grant access without realizing it has been tricked. Replay attacks do not necessarily require the attacker to know what the data means; they just need to capture it and play it back at the right time.
Replay attacks are particularly dangerous in systems where tokens or authentication messages are valid for a long time or where session management is weak. To prevent replay attacks, several methods are commonly used. Time-stamping is one. By adding a date and time to each authentication attempt, the system can tell whether a message is fresh or if it is old and potentially being replayed. Another method involves using unique session tokens that expire quickly. Once a token has been used, it becomes invalid, so even if an attacker captures it, they cannot use it again later. Strong encryption also plays a critical role. If the communication between the user and the system is encrypted, it is more difficult for attackers to capture and interpret the data in a useful way.
Next, we move on to pass-the-hash attacks. This technique is used primarily in environments where password hashes are stored on the system, such as in Microsoft Windows networks. A hash is a cryptographic representation of a password. In theory, hashes are designed to be one-way transformations, meaning that once a password is hashed, you should not be able to reverse it and find the original password. However, pass-the-hash attacks do not try to reverse the hash. Instead, they steal the hash and use it directly to authenticate to other systems. In effect, the attacker is passing the hash as if it were the password itself.
This method is powerful because it bypasses the need to crack or guess a password. It works particularly well in systems that accept hash-based authentication without verifying the source or context. To reduce the risk of pass-the-hash attacks, organizations need to follow strong credential hygiene. That includes storing hashes securely using salted and strong hashing algorithms, limiting administrative privileges to only what is needed, and separating duties so that not all users can access credential stores. In addition, systems should regularly rotate passwords and restrict how long credentials can be valid. Endpoint protection tools and privileged access management systems can also help by restricting how and when high-level credentials can be used.
For more cyber related content and books, please check out cyber author dot me. Also, there are other podcasts on Cybersecurity and more at Bare Metal Cyber dot com.
Now let’s talk about credential stuffing. This is one of the most common attacks on identity systems today, especially with the widespread availability of leaked credentials from previous breaches. Credential stuffing relies on the fact that many users reuse the same usernames and passwords across different websites and systems. Attackers take a list of known credentials, usually from a past data breach, and use automated tools to try those same combinations on other platforms. If a user has reused a password, the attacker may gain access without needing to guess or brute-force anything.
The reason credential stuffing is so dangerous is that it is simple to execute and difficult to detect using traditional tools. From the system’s perspective, it may appear that a legitimate user is logging in—just from an unusual location or at an unusual time. That is why defenses against credential stuffing must go beyond password policies. One key defense is multi-factor authentication. Even if an attacker has the correct password, they still need another piece of information to gain access, such as a token or biometric scan. Rate limiting and account lockouts can also help by detecting and blocking rapid, repeated login attempts. Another useful approach is credential breach monitoring, which alerts administrators when a user’s credentials are found in known data leaks. Educating users about password hygiene, such as using unique passwords for each account and using password managers, is also a fundamental part of the defense.
What all these attacks have in common is that they exploit weaknesses in how credentials are stored, transmitted, and reused. Because of that, defending against these threats requires a multi-layered approach. Organizations should use encryption wherever possible, both in transit and at rest. They should also minimize the lifespan of authentication tokens and session identifiers. Authentication systems should track usage patterns, look for anomalies, and require reauthentication after suspicious behavior. Monitoring tools that support identity and access management help detect attacks in progress, such as multiple login attempts from different locations or repeated failed authentication events. These tools can alert administrators or even automatically block traffic.
Strong credential management is another essential element. Passwords should never be stored in plain text, and even password hashes should be handled with care. Salting adds randomness to the hash, making it more difficult for attackers to use precomputed tables or rainbow tables to guess the original password. Furthermore, systems should avoid storing credentials where they are not needed. For example, applications that require authentication can use external identity providers through federation, so they never handle the credentials directly.
Multi-factor authentication deserves to be mentioned again because it offers one of the most effective barriers to identity-based attacks. By requiring more than one form of identity verification, you make it significantly harder for attackers to succeed with stolen credentials or replayed messages. Even if an attacker captures a hash or a password, they cannot access the account without the additional factor.
Organizations should also regularly review their access controls. Just because a user had access last month does not mean they still need it today. Regular access reviews and recertification ensure that users only have the privileges they need. It also helps detect anomalies, such as inactive accounts that still have permissions or accounts that have been escalated without approval.
On the infrastructure side, endpoint detection tools can help identify unusual behavior, such as tools that attempt to dump credentials or access protected memory areas. Limiting lateral movement within the network using segmentation or zero trust principles also reduces the damage an attacker can do even if one credential is compromised.
From a policy perspective, every organization should have a clear and enforceable identity and access management policy. That policy should spell out how credentials are managed, how accounts are created and retired, and what security controls are in place for authentication and access management. The policy should also define how often credentials are rotated, how breaches are handled, and who is responsible for monitoring authentication systems.
Finally, user training plays an important role. Users need to understand the importance of choosing strong, unique passwords and avoiding reuse. They also need to recognize phishing attacks, which are often the first step in stealing credentials. When users understand the reasons behind security controls, they are more likely to comply and more prepared to detect suspicious activity.
Thanks for joining us for this episode of The Bare Metal Cyber CISSP Prepcast. For more episodes, tools, and study support, visit us at Bare Metal Cyber dot com.
